We present ''programmer-guided reliability'' (PGR) as a systematic conceptual approach to address the expected rise in soft errors in coming extreme-scale systems at the application level. The approach involves instrumentation of the application with code to detect data corruption errors. The location and nature of these error detectors are at the discretion of the programmer, who uses their knowledge and experience with the problem domain, the application, the solution algorithms, etc., to determine the most vulnerable areas of the code and the most appropriate ways to detect data corruption. To illustrate the approach, we provide examples of error detectors from four different benchmark-scale applications. We also describe a simple control framework that allows for runtime configuration of the error detectors without recompilation of the application, as well as dynamic reconfiguration during the execution of the application. Finally, we discuss a number of future directions building on the basic PGR approach, including the incorporation of some general error detectors into the programming environment in order to make them more easily usable by the programmer.
Introduction
Expectations are that the drive to extreme-scale (exaflop and beyond) computing will result in significant changes to the reliability of computer systems and the applications running on them (Snir et al., 2014) .
On current systems, the major concern for applications is hard errors, which typically progress to fail-stop events, interrupting applications and often requiring physical repair activities, or at least a reboot of the system. At the application level, the most common approach today for dealing with such events is to take periodic checkpoints and in the event of a failure, roll back to the most recent available checkpoint (Agarwal et al., 2004; Takizawa et al., 2009; Moody et al., 2010; Ni et al., 2013) . Soft errors (e.g. data corruption) do not get much attention on today's systems. The majority are masked in the hardware (e.g. error-correcting codes on memory). Applications do sometimes experience unexplained crashes, or produce anomalous results. In general, such events could be attributable to either undetected errors in the software (the application or its supporting libraries and system software), or undetected errors in the application's state or instruction stream (data corruption). However, anecdotally,
computational scientists tend not to analyze such events deeply unless they are observed repeatably, and typically ''recover'' by simply re-running the simulation.
Going forward, we expect the picture to change in a number of ways. First, and most visible is the fact that scaling the computational capability of massively parallel computers is driven almost exclusively by adding components-nodes, processor cores, etc. Without concomitant improvements in the mean time between failures (MTBF) of the components, increasing component counts increases the likelihood of failures on purely statistical grounds. However, other significant changes are taking place as well. It is well recognized that the successive shrinking of lithographic technology processes used in producing semiconductor devices has a significant impact on power consumption, which is extremely beneficial to efforts to manage the overall power consumption of computer systems in order to meet the 20 MW targets for an exaflop system set by the U.S. Department of Energy. On the other hand, as process technology shrinks, the devices also become increasingly vulnerable to upsets, such as thermal or electrical variations, or energetic particle impacts (e.g. cosmic rays) (Borkar, 2005) . Additionally, techniques like dynamic power management and near-threshold operation of semiconductor devices, which are being explored to further reduce power consumption, exacerbate these vulnerabilities. An important feature of these vulnerabilities is that they tend to produce soft errorstransient conditions which corrupt data or signals in the system, and then return to normal operation, often referred to as silent data corruption (SDC) when they are not detected.
As a consequence of these trends, it is generally accepted that without other changes, future massively parallel systems are likely to experience faults with much greater frequency than current systems, and potentially a much higher proportion of soft errors (Cappello et al., 2009 (Cappello et al., , 2014 . At this point in time, it is not clear what is the best way to mitigate this change. Historically, as noted above, detection and, where possible, correction of errors has taken place primarily in the hardware. However, such strategies have costs in terms of chip area, power consumption, and, ultimately, dollars, that may be unpalatably high. At the same time, fault injection (FI) studies of applications (including libraries) suggest that in many cases, particular data structures and different parts of the algorithm vary significantly in their vulnerability to corrupted data (Hoemmen and Heroux, 2011) . So, not only is it potentially expensive to make the hardware exclusively responsible for fault mitigation, it is a ''blunt instrument'' in the sense that it may be more effective or less expensive in an overall sense to let some errors be handled higher up in the software stack, or perhaps, not at all if the application can tolerate them.
For applications to work effectively in an environment with (a) potentially much higher rates of soft errors, and (b) fault management responsibilities being distributed throughout the hardware and software stack, it will be necessary that those applications have to take a much more active role in ensuring their own reliability. This is true whether it is merely for a limited term of exploratory research, or part of a longer-term solution. To this end, we describe a concept we call ''programmer-guided reliability'' (PGR), which focuses primarily on the detection and possible recovery from data corruption errors that impact the application. While in its initial form, the approach relies heavily on the application developer to add ''error detectors'' to the code, we will discuss the potential for explicit support in the programming language and supporting libraries and runtime to facilitate it. We also demonstrate how a ''PGR application'' can potentially interact with lower layers of the software and hardware stack to adapt or tailor its fault handling.
In the remainder of this paper, we describe the programmer-guided reliability concept in detail (Section 2), and discuss related work (Section 3). Then we present several preliminary but concrete examples of the PGR concept in benchmark-scale applications (Section 4), and discuss possible extensions of this work (Section 5), and finally summarize the contributions of this paper (Section 6).
The programmer-guided reliability approach
Our goal for the PGR approach is to provide a conceptual framework to facilitate the systematic exploration of how soft errors, manifested as data corruption, can be most effectively handled at the application level. Furthermore, this framework defines general mechanisms and approaches to facilitate effective application interaction with lower layers of the software and hardware stack to cooperatively respond to such faults.
We are primarily interested in computational science and engineering simulation applications, though the approach would be equally applicable to most technical computing, and many other types of applications. In this context, the term application can also include the libraries used by the application.
From the application standpoint, data corruption is the most insidious kind of error, as it may allow the application to run to completion, but produce incorrect results. Such behavior can easily go unnoticed by the user (depending on the user's level of expertise, the attention with which they check the results, the severity of the error, and the availability of independently produced correct results that can be used for validation).
We address this problem straightforwardly, by ''instrumenting'' the application code with error detectors designed to verify the contents of data structures or other aspects of the on-going simulation. Error detectors may also be able to correct (some) errors, but this is not a requirement, as we consider the most important outcome of this approach to be a reduction in the likelihood that the application will complete, but give erroneous results. If correction of a detected error is not possible, we consider early termination of the application to be both acceptable and desirable. If the application checkpoints its state, recovery from a prior checkpoint may be possible, but we consider this outside the scope of the PGR concept itself.
The location, invocation frequency, and content of error detectors are at the discretion of the application developer, hence our term programmer-guided. The programmer brings domain expertise, practical experience, and a deeper understanding of the application to the task of deciding how and where to instrument their code. Their work may be informed by various tools, such as FI studies, but at present, there is no tool that can substitute for a knowledgeable human being in the ability to synthesize information from diverse sources as required to determine the most effective way to protect an application. Error detectors will vary in their scope and specificity. Some may be closely tied to the physical problem being solved, or its formulation. For example, the problem may have certain symmetry properties, which must be reflected in some of the data structures; or a matrix must be unitary. Other error detectors may be associated with the particular algorithms used in the solution. For example, a detector for matrix factorization may reconstitute and compare (a portion of) the original matrix using the computed factors. Still others might be more associated with certain data structures or programming constructs. For example, the contents of a read-only array might be periodically checksummed and compared to the reference value, or an iterator might be expected to yield monotonically increasing values. Redundant storage and/or execution is also widely recognized as an important technique for fault tolerance (e.g. double-and triple-modular redundancy) (Reis et al., 2005; Engelmann et al., 2009; Brightwell et al., 2010; Riesen et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2011) , and can also be used in PGR error detectors.
With experience gained through the manual application of the PGR concept, we expect that we will be able to identify error detection motifs that are effective in a wide range of contexts, and which can be readily reused. As we further discuss below (Section 5), these kinds of error detectors may be amenable to ''automation'' within the language implementation or runtime. However, we expect this to apply primarily to the ''lower-level'' error detectors, which focus on basic properties of common data structures or programming constructs. We do not expect most ''higher-level'' error detectors, those more associated with the problem, formulation, or solution algorithms, to be readily reusable, and therefore we expect manual instrumentation to continue to be a useful aspect even as the PGR approach matures and in some cases becomes more automated.
Error detectors will, naturally, entail some degree of additional memory, computation, or other resources. In some cases, this will be determined by the specifics of the error detector, in which case the only two possibilities for the detector are ''on'' or ''off''. While in other cases, the error detection algorithm may be tunable, offering the potential to trade off between the efficacy of the error detector and the additional resource utilization. For example, the strength of a checksum algorithm may be varied, or the frequency with which the error detector is applied (e.g. in an iterative or time-stepped simulation). Obviously, the ability to control error detectors by turning them off or on, or controlling the ''knobs'' which control their efficacy and cost, gives the user of a PGR application the ability to decide how much they are willing to ''pay'' for a given level of reliability. However, this also provides means by which the PGR application can interact with the rest of the system to adjust its reliability settings in response to its environment. We will expand on this idea with a simple example (Section 4.5) and further discussion below (Section 5).
Data corruption faults can occur at any time, including while error detectors themselves are executing, which may result in false-positives from the detector. It is possible to imagine various protections for the error detectors themselves to reduce the chances of such an occurrence. However it is also easy to imagine that such protections may be expensive, for example using redundant execution of the error detector. At this initial stage of development of the PGR concept, as with most other decisions, we leave it to the programmer to decide the extent to which they want to address such possibilities. It would be appropriate to revisit this question later for detectors which might be generalized and automated by incorporating them into parts of the programming environment, as discussed in Section 5.
Related work
The ideas underlying the PGR concept are not new. The contribution of the PGR approach is bring together a number of ideas which have appeared in the resilience literature and use them in a new way, to address the concern of SDC in extreme-scale scientific and technical applications. In this section, we try to connect our approach to some of these key ideas, and put it in a larger context of fault tolerance research.
The vast majority of high-performance (HPC) technical computing applications in regular use today have little to no ''awareness'' of faults or ability to handle them. Checkpoint/restart (Agarwal et al., 2004; Takizawa et al., 2009; Moody et al., 2010) remains the primary tool in this context, and it is primarily focused on dealing with fail-stop errors, though it can play a role in recovery from data corruption, if an uncorrupted checkpoint is available, and if the data corruption is detected.
A number of approaches have been proposed in the HPC community to increase fault awareness and handling within the application, though none are in routine use. The closest to the PGR approach is the concept of containment domains (CDs) (Chung et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2011) . In this approach, the application is broken up into segments which are executed in a transactional sense. At the end of each segment, or CD, is an acceptance test, which determines whether the segment has been executed correctly. If so, the results are committed (made visible to the rest of the system), and execution moves on to the next CD. If not, a recovery is attempted, which can utilize state information that can be marked for preservation at the beginning of the domain. Like the PGR concept, CDs are very flexible, in that they also rely on the application programmer to provide the appropriate tests and recovery code for each domain. Any PGR error detector could also serve as a CD acceptance test. On the other hand, the CD approach is more structured, and a complete implementation would require a framework to support the domain-level microcheckpointing (saved state), and the transactional nature of the approach. In a sense, CDs and the PGR concept are complementary. The CD approach emphasizes the design and implementation of the framework, while PGR focuses on the detection of (and possibly recovery from) errors, which also be used in the context of CDs. As presented so far, the CD approach does not include the idea of external control over the use of error detectors, which we discuss in Section 4.5.
Another approach to incorporating fault awareness into applications is the use of contracts, as pioneered by Bertrand Meyer (Meyer, 1986 (Meyer, , 1991 (Meyer, , 1992 , although they are usually cast as a software engineering approach rather than for fault tolerance. The ''design by contract'' approach defines pre-and post-conditions, as well as invariants associated with a unit of code, often a method or subroutine. The pre-and post-conditions and invariants are assertions that are made about the correct behavior of the code-if the preconditions are satisfied on entry, then the post-conditions will be satisfied on exit, and the invariants maintained. Although this approach originated in the context of verification of the code, it can equally well be used to detect data corruption. Where contracts are provided by a language or component software environment Devanbu, 2004, 2005; Dahlgren, 2007 Dahlgren, , 2008 Dahlgren et al., 2008) , they tend to be available only at interfaces, which can be limiting from a fault detection standpoint. Many languages support assertions anywhere in the code; however, a failed assertion generally causes termination of the program, which is not desirable if it is possible to recover from the detected error.
Replicated execution in MPI applications (Brightwell et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2011; Fiala et al., 2012) provides another technique to detect data corruption in applications. In this approach, multiple copies of each MPI rank are executed independently, and the messages transmitted from replicas are compared to detect corruption. Since this approach targets only MPI messages, it lacks the flexibility of the PGR approach, as well as those mentioned above to directly target the data structures used in the code. Additionally, this detector assumes that corrupted data will eventually be transmitted to another MPI process, which may not happen until long after the original corruption, if at all. The replicated MPI approach also has a fairly high overhead, including both the replication of the MPI processes and the verification of messages between replicas.
Algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) is a general approach which extends the solution algorithm to build in features and characteristics to facilitate responding to faults. Simply on the basis of this definition, PGR might be viewed as a form of ABFT. However based on current practice, we consider PGR to be distinct. Many ABFT approaches appearing in the literature include the concept of ''recovery tasks'' which typically process a version of the computation at lower resolution or fidelity. This approach is common in deadline-oriented environments, such as embedded processing (Rexford and Jha, 1992; Ural and Zhu, 2002) . In highperformance technical computing, as well as other contexts, coding techniques are typically used (Ltaief et al., 2008; Chen, 2011; Davies et al., 2011) . As it has been so far applied in HPC, it has been primarily focused on tolerating fail-stop failures in basic numerical algorithms, such as matrix multiplication or dense linear solvers, though it can also be used to detect corruption. However, there is no general prescription for producing an ABFT version of an algorithm, so this approach has seen limited application. We view ABFT as an approach that could be used for error detection and recovery within the more general conceptual framework of PGR.
It is also useful to recognize the existence of socalled ''naturally fault tolerant'' algorithms and applications, which have an innate ability to recover from some amount of loss or corruption of data (Engelmann and Geist, 2005) . While these traits are clearly desirable in the face of increasing fault rates, there are many important applications and algorithms which do not benefit from these characteristics.
The PGR approach relies on the application developer to decide where their code is most vulnerable and would benefit from the addition of error detectors. However, the programmer may find it useful to utilize tools to supplement their knowledge and experience. Fault injection (FI) studies a common way of understanding the vulnerabilities of an algorithm to various kinds of faults (Hsueh et al., 1997; Bronevetsky and de Supinski, 2008; Shantharam et al., 2011; Casas et al., 2012) . The approach is quite flexible, because the type of faults to inject, the placement, and the timing, are all, ultimately under the control of the FI tool user. However, the cost of FI testing grows enormously as its scope and generality increase (because of the number of injection points and the number of different faults to inject). Consequently, it is typically used only in constrained situations, for example focusing on a particular routine or algorithm, rather than an entire application. Static analysis of programs has also been used to develop ''vulnerability factors'' for applications (Xu et al., 2008) . Though we do not have space to discuss the details, our own work has been informed by, and tested with FI studies.
The Coordinated Infrastructure for Fault Tolerant Systems (CIFTS) project developed the concept of a Fault Tolerance Backplane (FTB) (Gupta et al., 2009) to facilitate communication of fault information throughout the hardware and software stack, including applications (Park et al., 2011; Shet et al., 2011) . Our own work on providing general control over detector configurations (Section 4.5) envisions PGR applications connected to such an infrastructure. The ABARIS framework provides configurable detection and recovery mechanisms for MPI (Jitsumoto et al., 2007) , though without any connection to an external fault information infrastructure.
One longer-range direction of our work is to identify error detection motifs which are both sufficiently useful and general to be built into the programming environment as a means to facilitate use of the PGR approach. Lidman et al. (Lidman et al., 2012) provide one example of this idea, using the ROSE source-to-source compiler to enable double-modular redundancy (DMR), triggered by a pragma in the source code. Of course, redundant execution-DMR, triple-modular redundancy, and higher levels-are well-known resilience techniques outside of language extensions as well (Reis et al., 2005; Engelmann et al., 2009; Brightwell et al., 2010; Riesen et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2011) . Another related area of work has been on automatic error detection, typically using the insertion of low-level code (without any particular knowledge of the application) at the compiler level, utilizing additional runtime support. GPU accelerators have been a particular target of such techniques in recent years (Yim et al., 2011; Wadden et al., 2014; Li et al., 2015) .
Example PGR scenarios
To illustrate how the programmer-guided reliability concept could be applied to scientific applications, we present brief examples of different types of error detectors in four different benchmark-scale applications: the three Scalable Synthetic Compact Applications (SSCA) (Bader et al., 2006) , as well as the LULESH shockhydrodynamics mini-application (Hornung et al., 2011; LULESH, n.d.) . For each, we illustrate one or more error detection strategies selected based on a programmer's understanding of the application. Some of the detectors have the potential to be generalized and automated, as discussed further in Section 5, while others are more specific to the higher-level details of the application. We also illustrate the potential for applicationlevel PGR instrumentation to interact with lower-level parts of the system. The SSCA #1 and SSCA #2 applications we studied were implemented in the Chapel programming language (Chamberlain et al., 2007; Cray, 2014) , while we used C implementations of SSCA #3 and LULESH.
The FI experiments described were carried out on single-process executions, since there is nothing in the error detection approaches used in these studies which depends on parallelism. Experiments with the three SSCA benchmarks and external interfacing of the PGR environment were carried out on a 4 3 8-core AMD Operton 6128 Magny-Cours system, running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.8 and version 1.9.0 of the Chapel compiler. Experiments with LULESH were carried out on a 2 3 4-core Intel Xeon E5520 system, running Scientific Linux 6.5 and the OpenARC C compiler (Lee and Vetter, 2014; Denny et al., 2015) . To simplify comparison, performance characteristics of error detectors are reported relative to baseline executions on the same platforms with the detectors turned off. Performance impacts should be considered indicative rather than definitive, as we have not made special efforts to optimize the implementations of the error detectors.
SSCA #1: Bioinformatics
Application description. The Scalable Synthetic Compact Application (SSCA) #1 (Bader et al., 2006) solves an optimal pattern matching problem in bioinformatics, with a sequence of five distinct kernels: pairwise local alignment of sequences, sequence extraction, locating similar sequences, aligning pairs of similar sequences, and multiple sequence alignment. SSCA #1 is characterized by dynamic programming algorithms. The code is loop-oriented, and utilizes almost exclusively integer operations. Table lookups and min/max operations are prominent.
Error detection approach. In this work, we focused on the first SSCA #1 kernel, computing the pairwise local alignment of sequences using the Smith-Watterman algorithm. We instrumented five of the variables in this kernel with error detectors, including a constant (within the scope of the targeted kernel), a data array (V), a scalar result value (minScore), and two array indices (m, j), and a temporary variable (r). The error detectors offer a variety of ways to protect each datum, which are configurable at run time, and leverage the limited range of the data in the cases of interest (21-bit integers) to pack the value and its protection within the standard 64-bit integer representation using programmer-provided functions uint21_rel_ pack() and uint21_rel_unpack(). A sample fragment of the code using this error detection approach is shown in Listing 1. Protections include: a mirrored validity bit (RAW), a parity bit (PAR), the log 2 of the datum (LOG), fast-hash (FSH), and doubly-and triply-redundant storage of the datum (DMR and TMR). Note that the code fragment shown is oblivious to the specific protection mechanism selected.
It is also worth noting that the SSCA #1 implementation possesses some natural fault-tolerance characteristics. Pairwise alignment is an optimization problem, which includes a form of sub-problem scoring. In that context, a fault may lead to unintentional search space pruning. Faults which cause sub-optimal solutions to be discarded prematurely merely accelerate what the algorithm would have done anyway, and the process can still complete with a correct result. If the fault causes the optimal solution to be discarded, of course a suboptimal result will be returned. Additionally, operations such as max(a,b), which are common in SSCA #1, have a measure of fault tolerance, in that a fault altering either operand may leave the relation unchanged.
Evaluation. We carried out FI experiments in which double-bit faults were randomly injected into the protected data structures with different combinations of detectors on each of the variables.
The combinations of detectors are displayed in Table 1 . Without any protection, we found that approximately 2% of executions under FI led to successful, correct results, with the remainder of executions producing either incorrect results or terminating prematurely. Other configurations provide detection rates in excess of 70%, with performance overheads varying between 125% and 200% of the base (no protection) time for fault-free executions. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
SSCA #2: Graph analysis
Application description. SSCA #2 (Bader et al., 2006) solves a graph analysis problem, computing the maximum node betweenness centrality, with a sequence of four kernels: graph generation, classifying large sets, extracting sub-graphs, and graph clustering. The betweenness centrality metric is the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others which pass through a given node in the graph.
Error detection approach. In this work, we focused on the final kernel of the application, which computes the between centrality metric and several approximations. The graph is represented as a list of neighbors associated with each node. The error detector in this case is a simple bounds check that the neighbors are valid nodes, based on the known number of nodes in the graph (Listing 2). In this case, errors that result in the neighbor node id being incorrect, but within the bounds of total number of nodes, will not be detected, while those which produce out-of-bounds neighbors will be detected. Detection efficacy (and overhead) is controlled using two control parameters: checkFreq, which controls how often the detection mechanism is applied in loops that traverse the entire graph in the target kernel, and prob, which controls the percentage of nodes in the graph whose connected edges will be checked (as seen in Listing 2).
Evaluation. The flexibility afforded by the two aforementioned control parameters enable fine control over the trade-off between resilience and performance. To explore this approach, the SSCA2 benchmark that is included in the Chapel language distribution was instrumented to incorporate randomized bit FI into the data structure that represents the edges of the graph. The error detector was incorporated into the code of the benchmark kernel that computes the betweenness centrality measure. Figure 2 show the result from one study, where the checkFreq parameter was set to invoke the error detector once every 10 vertices in two loops in the kernel which traverse the entire graph. For each level of coverage (as represented by the probabilistic percentage of vertices whose connected edges are checked), the benchmark was executed a total of 100 times. The probability of flipping a bit in any given edge was set at 0.01. Figure 2 shows the percentage of the runs where the detector successfully caught the error before the run crashed (which happened in all the runs). The results show that when 10% of the nodes in the graph are verified, roughly 25% of the errors are detected. However at 50% coverage, 80% of errors are detected, and at 70% coverage, approximately 95% of errors are detected.
The overhead incurred when exercising various combinations of the error detection control variables was also explored. Figure 3 shows the normalized run time of the error-free benchmark for different levels of checking frequency and coverage. The plot shows the runtime normalized to the runtime of the benchmark with no error detection. As expected, as error detection is deployed more aggressively, the associated overhead increases proportionally. It is thus possible, using data represented in Figures 2 and 3 , to choose an appropriate error detection strategy that balances the efficacy of the error detection with the incurred runtime cost.
SSCA #3: Synthetic aperture radar
Application description. SSCA #3 (Bader et al., 2006) implements a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) processing pipeline, including file I/O. After the raw data is generated, the first stage of the pipeline represents the front-end sensor processing, and involves reading the raw data and processing it to produce an image. The second stage represents the back-end knowledge formation, and involves image retrieval and pairwise comparison to detect image features.
Error detection approach. In this case, we focus our error detection on two data structures which provide the parameters to control most of the application as well as files containing SAR images. The data structures are long-lived and read-only through most of the application, and so are particularly vulnerable to data corruption. We use simple checksum algorithms to periodically verify the contents of these data structures (Listing 3) and MD5 checksum (Rivest, 1992) for image files. We have experimented with CRC-16, CRC-32, Fletcher-16, and Fletcher-32 algorithms (CRC, 2000; FLE, 2016) . Since the data structures are too small to produce any collisions in the checksum algorithms, any single-bit fault injected in the data structure will be detected. We can vary when the checksums are verified in order to manage the cost and efficacy of the error detector (in this case, the efficacy equates to how quickly the error will be detected, and how long errors will have a chance to propagate). For example, the checksum can be verified just prior to updating the data structure, and on entry to or exit from functions that read the data structure, or any combination of the three. The image files are verified when they are written to and read from memory, which occurs at the end of the first stage and beginning of the second stage, respectively.
Evaluation. Since the checksum error detection schemas implemented in SSCA #3 detect all single-bit faults given the sizes of the data structures, we evaluate this error detection approach by assessing the performance costs of checksum verification at various frequencies and provide a rudimentary quantification of reliability based on the checksum frequency.
Our experiments consist of five combinations of checksum verification of the critical data structures and and SAR image files, as indicated in Table 2 . In this example, checksums may be calculated every time the key data structures are written, on entry into any function in which they are read, and on exit from any such function. Additionally, an MD5 hash operation may be applied to the image file. Since in this case, the detectors are guaranteed to detect the injected faults, we focus on the length of time erroneous data is exposed, during which it could be used and/or propagated to derived quantities. In order to produce a measure of the ''efficacy'' of error detection, we use the inverse of the number of clock cycles during which erroneous data is exposed as our reliability metric, as shown in the table. This metric would be 1 if errors were detected immediately after injection. Lower values imply lower detector efficacy.
We also measured the performance impact of the detectors by comparing the execution time with the error detectors to the time without any error detection. Counter-intuitively, all five of the detector modes show slight speedups relative to the base case, as shown in the last column of Table 2 . Since SSCA #3 is a data intensive, I/O bound application, the additional computation required for verification is a negligible part of the overall cost. We believe that the shorter execution times may be due to improvements in temporal locality of certain critical data. Although these results are the average of five runs of each experiment, it is also possible that this is insufficient to statistically characterize the natural variation in execution time.
LULESH: Shock hydrodynamics
Application description. The Livermore Unstructured Lagrangian Explicit Shock Hydrodynamics (LULESH) code (Hornung et al., 2011; LULESH, n.d.) is a miniapplication meant to model the key computational aspects of a full shock-hydrodynamics code, such as ALE3D (ALE3D, n.d.). LULESH approximates the hydrodynamics equations by discretely partitioning the spatial problem domain into a collection of volumetric elements defined by a mesh, and proceeds to solve the time evolution of the system on that mesh.
Error Detection approach. LULESH targets problems with spherical symmetry, and for this application we have chosen an error detector tied to that fact, leveraging geometrical characteristics of the system to identify symmetrically redundant data which is retained in the simulation. If any of the three symmetrically equivalent data disagree, they are replaced with the average of the values (Listing 4). While, strictly speaking, this is not the correct value for the data, it replaces test-heavy voting logic with a simpler arithmetic computation, and relies on the iterative nature of LULESH's algorithm to eventually yield the correct result. It is interesting to note that in some cases, this approach detects errors which do not affect the final results, probably also due to the iterative nature of the solution algorithm. The cost and efficacy of this detector can be modified by varying the density and frequency with which the data points are sampled.
Evaluation. Figure 4 shows the efficacy of the symmetry-based error detector and corrector (a.k.a. algorithm-based error detector/corrector), where we performed 1-bit-FI tests on each of major user data in LULESH. For user-data-specific FI tests, we used a directive-based, application-level FI tool called FITL (Denny et al., 2015) . In the figure, N refers to no visible output error, E refers to visible output error, D refers to the case where the detector caught the error, ND is the case where the error was not detected, R means that the symmetry-based error corrector could recover the error, and NR is the case where the corrector could not recover the error. For example, E(ND) indicates that the error detector did not trigger and erroneous results occurred, and N(D-NR) refers to the case where the detector caught the error but could not recover it, and the error did not affect the final results. The latter case Table 2 . Summary of error detection schema performance and reliability quantification. CRC-32 columns refer to checksum operations applied to key data structure when they are written to, and on entry to and exit from functions that read them. The reliability metric is explained in the text, but 1 would imply immediate detection of the error, and lower values imply lower detector efficacy. Performance is measured relative to the execution time with no detectors active, so values less than 1.0 indicate speedup. can occur since LULESH stores truncated results into the output file (6-decimal-place outputs) while the detector triggers with a high sensitivity, detecting relative errors higher than 1e-13. The iterative nature of LULESH also contributes to the error truncation, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The figure indicates that each user data has different vulnerability to the FIs; for example, temporary data that are updated at each time step before they are read are very immune to the FIs, while persistent data whose values are carried across iterations of the time-step loop have higher chance to propagate the injected errors, more vulnerable to the FIs. The figure also indicates that our symmetry-based detector works well in most cases, while the corrector is less effective in some cases.
We also compared the algorithm-based detectors with simple checksum-based detectors, which leverage the fact that the primary data structures are largely read-mostly, except during update phases. Figure 5 shows the performance of various detectors. In this figure, when the sampling rate is 100%, which means that all the elements of the target arrays are used for error detection calculation, we find that the algorithmbased detector picks up nearly all of injected faults with a performance overhead of less than 2%, while checksums based on XOR operations (CBED:XOR) or simple arithmetic sums (CBED:Sum) catch 80% and 50% of faults respectively, at a similar cost. (The error detection coverage higher than 100% means that the error detector detected more faults than the number of faults incurring visible output errors.) Experiments varying sampling rates show that the tested error detectors incur overheads linearly proportional to detection coverage.
External interactions with PGR error detectors
Naturally, the user of a PGR application may wish to control which error detection instrumentation is turned on, and what ''level'' the detector is set to (where appropriate). We have designed and implemented a simple proof-of-principle version of such a capability as a set of Chapel classes. The system consists of two components, an application-facing ''front-end,'' which is called by the error detector code within the application, and a ''back-end'' which maintains the configuration state and allows the configuration to be set or changed.
The front-end interface provides calls to register error detectors (to give them a name that can be associated with configuration information in the back-end), and set the model for different ''protection levels,'' which can be associated with different choices of detector efficacy and performance. Many error detectors will have just two protection levels, corresponding to whether they are ''off'' or ''on.'' However, as illustrated in the preceding example scenarios, many error detectors may offer multiple protection levels, allowing different trade-offs between reliability and performance impact. The front-end also supports querying the backend for the desired protection level of the detector. Listing 5 illustrates the methods.
The application becomes aware of requests from the back-end to change the protections level of an error detector using a query call provided by the front-end. Since error detectors may be stateful, it is not always possible to reconfigure detectors at arbitrary times (i.e. asynchronously under the direct control of the backend). However, the programmer can insert these query calls to obtain the desired protection level at any point in the code at which the detector can be reconfigured. This also implies that response to changes requested by the back-end will not be instantaneous. Rather, as the application executes, and passes reconfiguration points for the various error detectors, new settings will come into force.
The back-end component maintains the registry of the error detectors and their configurations. The simplest form of this, which we have currently implemented, involves a configuration file which lists the detectors and their desired protection level. To run the application with no error protection, for example, the configuration file would simply turn all of the detectors off. The back-end supports dynamic updates to the configurations of the error detectors. This allows the PGR application to respond to changes in the environment as execution progresses, for example, shifting from a ''high-protection'' mode (i.e. all error detectors on) to a high-performance mode (i.e. all error detectors off). In our proof-of-principle implementation, this is accomplished straightforwardly by periodically detecting that the configuration file has changed and rereading it. Another approach might be to use a signal generated by the user to trigger the re-read of the configuration, as is common with many Unix daemons. Obviously, the user-side control interface can be made much more sophisticated if desired.
However, this same back-end could also be interfaced to a monitoring environment, which would allow configuration changes to be triggered automatically by events in the rest of the software and hardware stack. For example, the user may wish to maximize the performance of their PGR application by turning off error detectors by default, but configure the monitoring system to increase the protection level in the event that high rates of correctable memory errors are observed. This is precisely the kind of use case envisioned for the Fault Tolerant Backplane (FTB) (Gupta et al., 2009; Park et al., 2011; Shet et al., 2011) , but in principle nearly any kind of monitoring environment that can provide rule-based triggers could be used with the current control system.
Discussion and future directions
The primary purpose of this paper is to describe the principles behind the PGR approach to applicationlevel fault tolerance, and to provide a few simple examples of how such an approach might work. The fact that PGR relies heavily on the programmer is an important advantage in providing significant flexibility. However it is also clearly a burden if too much code has to be Figure 5 . Positioning of LULESH in resilience-performance (R-P) space when different detectors with different sampling rates (10%, 50%, and 100%) are applied.
(ABED: algorithm-based error detector, CBED:Sum: checksum-based error detector using arithmetic sums, and CBED:XOR: checksum-based error detector using XOR operations.) added in order to implement useful error detectors. While all of the examples discussed in this paper were hand-coded, one of our long-term strategies for the PGR approach is to identify error detection motifs which are both useful (in that they do a reasonably good job of detecting errors, given their complexity and cost) and readily reusable (in that they are not unduly specific to a given application or algorithm), and which can be largely ''automated'' in their implementation through various kinds of support within the language and runtime environment of the application.
Obviously, this will not work for all error detectors. For example, the LULESH detector which leverages the symmetry of the problem is not likely to be widely reusable. But you may have noticed that many of our other examples in Section 4 used approaches like checksums and bounds checks, which are much more general, and therefore, much more amenable to automation. Such automation could take the form of language extensions, perhaps relying on the compiler to generate appropriate code, or building constructs into library layers that might be intrinsic or extrinsic to the language.
For example, checksumming of data structures is a common operation, which we used in the SSCA #3 and LULESH examples. The base language could be extended to support an attribute such as protected on the declaration, which might take the desired checksum routine as an argument. Alternatively, an objectoriented language could use a generic protection ''wrapper'' to protect the target data structure. The primary operations provided by this wrapper, or by the protected attribute would be computing the reference checksum and verifying the checksum.
In the SSCA #2 example, we used bounds checking on data values (which is distinct from bounds checking of array indices, provided in some languages or compilers). It would be straightforward to extend a language with the idea that values of a variable must be within an interval, [a,b] . Note that this is different from the interval arithmetic, which expresses the concept of the uncertainty associated with a value rather than expressing a range of validity, and would be used quite differently in a program. Fundamentally, an object of this type would carry with it the bounds of its validity. Testing of the value against the bounds could be automatic, whenever the value is read or written, but that would probably cost too much for many applications. Instead, such an object could provide a method to verify the value on demand.
Redundant storage (used in SSCA #1) and computation are well-known resilience techniques, often referred to as double-and triple-modular redundancy (DMR, TMR) (Reis et al., 2005; Engelmann et al., 2009; Brightwell et al., 2010; Riesen et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2011) . Redundant storage of data structures could be provided similarly to the checksum protection described above. Simple annotations (i.e. structured comments) can allow arbitrary blocks of code to be executed in DMR or TMR fashion (Lidman et al., 2012) . In programming environments that offer taskbased execution models, DMR and TMR execution could be simple annotations on the task launch operation. For example, in Chapel (Chamberlain et al., 2007; Cray, 2014) , the begin statement might be extended to support begin(dmr).
As a final example, language constructs like iterators could be extended to add a contract annotation (e.g. monotonically_increasing) which would denote properties of the iterator that could be relied upon from an error detection standpoint. Such contracts could be verified by caching one or more previous iterations and comparing them to verify the contracted behavior.
Summary
In this paper, we have presented the basic concepts of programmer-guided reliability (PGR), as a general approach to making applications more robust to data corruption arising from the expected increasing frequency of soft errors in coming extreme-scale systems. The approach relies on the application programmers to instrument the code with error detectors, and allows them to target portions of the application they consider to be most vulnerable, based on their experience and knowledge of the application. We provided examples of different kinds of error detectors, some of which were tied to specifics of the problem structure and the solution algorithm, while others were more generic, for example checksumming of data structures. We also described a simple control interface that allows runtime control over the error detector configuration, which could also be interfaced into a monitoring system to allow automatic reconfiguration, for example in response to a rise in the number of errors detected in the system. Finally, we described possible future work around incorporating some of the more generic (reusable) detectors into other parts of the programming environment (e.g. language extensions, compiler code generation capabilities, runtime library capabilities) that would allow the programmer to invoke the detection mechanisms simply (i.e. through annotations or method calls) without having to code the detectors themselves. However, we also believe that it is important to retain the possibility for the programmer to explicitly provide error detectors to accommodate situations which are more application specific.
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